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Playing in the Sandbox: Moral
Development and the Duty of Care
in Collaborations between
For-Profit and Nonprofit
Corporate Persons
Christyne J. Vachon, Esq.*1
Over the history of the corporate entity, U.S. law has
evolved to treat the corporate entity as a legal person under the
U.S. Constitution. Despite the increased rights granted to the
corporation as a legal person, both for-profit and nonprofit
corporations have come under considerable scrutiny for
misconduct and issues related to corporate governance. When
for-profit and nonprofit organizations collaborate together,
however, both organizations generally seek to achieve
philanthropic good. On the other hand, both organizations and
their management are bound by law to fulfill specific duties to
their individual constituents. In the 1930s, psychologist Jean

* Christyne J. Vachon is a visiting professor of law at the University of
North Dakota, School of Law. She will continue as a tenure-eligible assistant
professor of law in August 2013. In addition, Christyne J. Vachon is a private
practitioner in for-profit and nonprofit law. Professor Vachon wishes to thank
the friends and colleagues with whom she worked, including Eve Brank, Joan
Heminway, George Kuney, and Sandi Zellmer for their support, Heather
Williams and Daniel Murow for research assistance, and the University of
Nebraska, Lincoln and the University of Tennessee, Knoxville for support
during the research and writing process.
1. This article pulls together ideas published by three leading
researchers in their fields: JAMES E. AUSTIN, THE COLLABORATION CHALLENGE:
HOW NONPROFITS AND BUSINESSES SUCCEED THROUGH STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
21 (2000); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern
Corporation: An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 477 (1995); and JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD
(Marjorie Gabain trans., 1997). Sections II through V of this article are
substantially based on an article by Christine J. Vachon, Scratch My Back,
and I’ll Scratch Yours: Scratching the Surface of the Duty of Care in Cross
Sector Collaborations, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1 (2012).
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Piaget noted, “[t]he good, in short, is not, like duty, the result of
a constraint exercised by society upon the individual. The
aspiration to the good is of different stuff from the obedience
given to an imperative rule.”2 Guided by the basis for Piaget’s
above assertion related to the natural person, this article
begins an analysis of the relationship between legal persons:
collaborating for-profit and nonprofit organizations in light of
duty, arguing that there is a balance between too much
constraint and none that leads to sustainability of the
cooperative venture.
I.

Introduction

In the 1930s, psychologist Jean Piaget noted, “[t]he good,
in short, is not, like duty, the result of a constraint exercised by
society upon the individual. The aspiration to the good is of
different stuff from the obedience given to an imperative rule.”3
Over the history of the corporate entity, U.S. law has evolved to
treat the corporate entity as a legal person under the U.S.
Constitution.4 As the corporate entity is assuming additional
2. PIAGET, supra
THE CHILD (1984).

note 1, at 354. See also JEROME KAGAN, THE NATURE OF

3. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 354.
4. In 1819, the Court in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward
noted the corporation was an artificial person. 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). The
corporate charter granted it life and could not be altered by the state. Id. In
his concurring opinion, Justice Story noted that the corporation, “a collection
of individuals, united under one collective body, under a special name, and
possessing certain immunities, privileges and capacities,” has a life of its own
and akin to a natural person. Id. at 667 (Story, J., concurring). In 1882, the
meaning of “person” in the Fourteenth Amendment was expanded to include
an artificial person. Cnty. of San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 13 F. 145, 150
(C.C.D. Cal 1882). In 1886, the Fourteenth Amendment’s application was
expanded to include corporations. Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co.,
118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). In 1889 the Supreme Court ruled that a corporation
is a “person” for due process and equal protection. Minneapolis & St. Louis
Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889). In 1893, the Court found that
corporations have a claim under the Bill of Rights. Noble v. Union River
Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165 (1893). In 1905, the Court invalidated
government action against the corporation essentially for violating
substantive due process. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In 1906,
the Court granted corporations Fourth Amendment “search and seizure”
protection. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). In 1908, the Court granted
corporations the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because a corporate
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legal protection as a legal person under the Constitution, the
question remains whether moral and ethical standards and
thought apply similarly to the artificial person, the corporation.
This Article explores the moral development of the corporation
from the perspective of Piaget’s theory of the moral
development of the child. In particular, the Article examines
the moral development in the setting of the cross-sector
collaboration between a for-profit corporation and a nonprofit
corporation along a continuum of increasing engagement.
Cross-sector interactions between nonprofit and for-profit
institutions through collaboration on the path to a
philanthropic goal (“Collaboration”) take on a particularly
unique perspective when considering the collaborators are
actually legal persons for many situations under law. “[I]t is
continually becoming more evident that values-based
leadership, synergistic generation of social and economic value,
and strategic cross-sector alliances are key ingredients to
achieving sustainably successful business.”5 When for-profit
and nonprofit organizations engage in collaboration, both
organizations generally seek to achieve a philanthropic good.
On the other hand, both organizations and their management
are bound by law to fulfill specific duties. Although the goal of
the Collaboration is to promote the philanthropic mission of the
nonprofit, each organization enters the collaboration with its
own goals, hoping to gain from opportunities offered by other
collaborators. Guided by the basis for Piaget’s above assertion,
this article begins an analysis of the relationship between
collaborating for-profit and nonprofit organizations in light of
duty and moral decision making, and discovers that a medium
ground of regulation may allow both entities to achieve their

defendant was considered the “accused.” Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200
U.S. 226 (1906). In 1922, the Court applied the Fifth Amendment “takings
clause” compensation for a corporation subject to a governmental regulation.
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In 1936, the Court applied the
First Amendment right to freedom of speech to a newspaper corporation for
tax-free sale of advertising in newspapers. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936). The law progressed in a similar manner until the Supreme
Court’s recent decisions in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and
FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011).
5. James E. Austin & Ezequiel Reficco, Corporate Social
Entrepreneurship, 11 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 86, 90 (2009).
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moral potential. The medium ground provides flexibility and
reliability similar to the guidance of the U.S. Constitution, of
which corporations are increasingly granted protection.
To aid in the analysis I adopt the premise of a continuum
of engagement set forth by James Austin (the “Continuum”)
and applied in the analysis of my article Scratch My Back.6
Under this premise, for-profits and nonprofits engage in
collaborations at various levels along a Continuum. For
example, on a basic level, a for-profit may simply make a
donation to a nonprofit. On the other hand, a nonprofit and a
for-profit may achieve more collective action on a regular basis
and have integrated aspects of the businesses.
This Article provides an extended analysis of the
Collaboration between two unaffiliated entities, the nonprofit
and the for-profit, building off of my conclusions in Scratch My
Back.7 In Part II, this article briefly sets forth the background
for and my argument in Scratch My Back that in order for the
Collaboration to survive and fulfill the goals of both entities,
the more integrated the Collaboration becomes, the more the
for-profit needs to consider monitoring and assisting with the
management of the nonprofit to fulfill its duty of care in
decision making and oversight of the nonprofit. With an aim to
better understand the unique relationship between a for-profit
and nonprofit in Collaboration, this Article discusses the
potential for application to this analysis of psychologist Jean
Piaget’s theory of the moral development of the child through
the influence of constraint and cooperation.8
In Part III, this Article provides a general description of
Jean Piaget’s theory of moral development of the child and
applies it to the analysis of the duty of care of the management
of the for-profit and the nonprofit in the Collaboration along
6. Vachon, supra note 1.
7. There are other relationships between for-profits and nonprofits, but
this paper does not seek to provide an analysis of corporate governance that
is equally applicable to those relationships. For instance, in a situation where
a for-profit has a subsidiary nonprofit, it is well recognized that the fiduciary
duty analysis of a parent-subsidiary relationship applies a modified standard.
See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
8. PIAGET, supra note 1. “Although, humans do not seem to be specially
programmed for a particular profile of moral missions, they are prepared to
invent and believe in some ethical mission.” KAGAN, supra note 2, at 153.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/5

4

2013]

PLAYING IN THE SANDBOX

1049

the Continuum. Lawrence E. Mitchell, in his article
Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An
Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, applied
Piaget’s moral development theory to corporations as a
cooperative enterprise.9 Recognizing the goal of a Collaboration
to promote good and that Piaget’s theory offers an ideal model
for promoting moral thinking in children, I will extend the
application of Piaget’s moral development theory to an analysis
of the Collaboration, a cooperative venture, between a
nonprofit and for-profit.
Piaget determined that children would be challenged to
develop into autonomous, moral adults with constraint,
attributed to adults and superiors.10 Instead, if the child
participates in cooperative games and other play involving
those who are equals to the child, such as games in a sandbox,
they are more likely to develop into moral adults respecting
others, recognizing good through independent thought than as
a duty imposed by adults.11 At play, as in a sandbox, the child
learns to perceive his own moral autonomy and, in turn, to
respect and value the autonomy of others.12
Along this line, Jean Piaget’s theory of a child’s moral
development sheds light on the need for a relationship of
mutual respect and equity between the nonprofit and the forprofit as they play in the Collaboration sandbox. As Mitchell so
clearly articulated in his article Cooperation and Constraint in
the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry into the Causes of
Corporate Immorality, “[Piaget] saw implications for social
structure in his findings on the development of moralityimplications that are equally applicable to the corporation.”13
Although the study of Piaget’s insights cannot definitively
resolve the challenges of corporate governance, they can
provide guidance, especially since the underlying activities of
the collaborating entities are governed by natural persons.14
Indeed, from this analysis, no conclusion should be drawn that
9. Mitchell, supra note 1.
10. See generally, PIAGET, supra note 1.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 94-95. See also Mitchell, supra note 1.
13. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 493.
14. Id. at 493, 499.
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either the nonprofit or the for-profit is equated with a child.
Instead, this Article applies Piaget’s theory to the
Collaboration because, as with Piaget’s premise, the
Collaboration seeks to promote good but offers potential for a
situation of inequity or equity, unilateral respect or mutual
respect, and constraint or cooperation.
This Article suggests that the duty of care requires finding
the right balance between constraint and unilateralism, and
cooperation and mutual respect in interactions between the
collaborating parties, and, in the future, may be influenced
positively or negatively by law makers depending on the
approach they take towards constraint or encouraging
cooperation. These decisions will have corresponding
implications for the development and growth of the
Collaboration along the Continuum.
II. Intertwined Duty of Care
The nonprofit and for-profit are intended to be different
types of organizations, and, despite increasing blurring of the
distinctions between the two entities, continue, to a certain
degree, to maintain some of the corresponding differences.15
Part of any analysis of the fiduciary duties in the cooperative
enterprise of a Collaboration, includes understanding the
primary mission for each organization: for-profit businesses are
organized and operated primarily for the pursuit of profit and
gains to the shareholders, the nonprofits are organized and
operated in pursuit of its philanthropic mission.16
A. The For-Profit
The for-profit is designed to emphasize one “good” over
others. The “good” is profit maximization for the owners of the
corporation (the shareholders), referred to as “shareholder

15. Gail A. Lasprogata & Marya N. Cotten, Contemplating “Enterprise”:
The Business and Legal Challenges of Social Entrepreneurship, 41 AM. BUS.
L.J. 67, 73-74 (2003).
16. Vachon, supra note 1, at 37.
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primacy.”17 Today, however, shareholder primacy is still the
norm in many jurisdictions.18 The corporation’s governance is
the subject of state corporate law, which holds that the board
and management owe fiduciary duties only, or primarily, to the
shareholders. Therefore, the emphasis of management conduct
has been on the profit motive.19 More recently, however, law
and public opinion have recognized socially-accountable forprofits.20 Translated, profit maximization represents the
mission of the for-profit company, and, some argue, to the
exclusion of the interests of stakeholders.21 Concern for social
responsibility by management might impair the pursuit of
profit maximization,22 which would arguably be a breach of the
fiduciary duties to the shareholders.23
For-profits may enter into a Collaboration with a nonprofit
hoping that the nonprofit’s image will help to improve, enhance
or repair the for-profit’s image.24 In this way, for-profits may
approach the Collaboration as an opportunity to improve the
17. Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Law, Corporate Constituency
Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 87; see
also Mitchell, supra note 1, at 501.
18. Springer, supra note 17, at 97.
19. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders:
A Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401 (1993). But see Einer
Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 733, 738 (2005) (stating that “[n]one of the fifty states has a statute that
imposes a duty to profit-maximize or that makes profit-maximization the sole
purpose of the corporation”).
20. DAVID BORNSTEIN & SUSAN DAVIS, SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: WHAT
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 4-5 (2010).
21. SeeMilton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970; Elizabeth A. Weeks,
Loopholes: Opportunity, Responsibility, or Liability?, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
320, 320 (2007); HAROLD L. JOHNSON, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
PERFORMANCE: SURVEY, EVALUATION, AND PROSPECTS 9 (1979).
22. Weeks, supra note 21, at 320.
23. But see Chris Cornforth, Introduction: The Changing Context of
Governance—Emerging Issues and Paradoxes, in THE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC
AND NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: WHAT DO BOARDS DO? 1, 7-8 (Chris
Cornforth ed., 2003) [hereinafter Cornforth]. According to the agency theory
of compliance (the most frequently used theory in corporate governance),
management acts for the interests of themselves rather than the
shareholders or mission. Arguably the duty of loyalty and good faith may be
implicated as well. Id.
24. Alan R. Andreasen, Profits For Nonprofits: Find a Corporate Partner,
74 HARV. BUS. REV. 47, 56 (1996).
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B. The Nonprofit
The nonprofit is a company also created under state law
with a philanthropic mission. Under federal law, the Internal
Revenue Code governs tax-exempt nonprofits.26 In an economy
of limited resources, there is abundant competition for limited
funds for nonprofits. Consequently, nonprofits explore other
avenues of raising funds, including entering into a
Collaboration with a for-profit.27
The nonprofit’s board of directors serves as the “‘guardians’
of the charity’s mission.”28 While the governance law applicable
to nonprofits is underdeveloped compared to that of forprofits,29 the IRS has taken a role to try to articulate some
standards. In its 2008 Position Paper on Corporate
Governance, the IRS encouraged “an active and engaged board
believing that it is important to the success of a charity and to
its compliance with applicable law.”30 In general, one of the
biggest challenges faced by a nonprofit and its management is
to keep the business focused on the intended goal(s) of the
company.31 In fact, commercialization may be the strongest

25. See id. (stating that “consumers respond to the halo effect”).
26. Austin & Reficco, supra note 5, at 90. “Section 501 of the Internal
Revenue Code provides several different categories of organization types for
which tax-exempt status is an option.” Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 15,
at 74.
27. Andreasen, supra note 24, at 48; Howard P. Tuckman,
Commercialization and For-Profits in Disguise, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL SOCIETY 504, 504 (2010) (indicating that a reason
there is a growth in commercial activities by nonprofits is the serious
challenge to raise funds); see also Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 15, at 68.
28. Cornforth, supra note 23, at 8.
29. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U.
PA. L. REV. 497, 500 (1981).
30. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS –
501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS. § 3 (Feb. 4, 2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/governance_practices.pdf [hereinafter IRS GOVERNANCE].
31. Sean Silverthorne, Achieving Excellence in Nonprofits Q&A with:
Herman
B.
Leonard,
HARV.
BUS.
SCH.
(Oct.
27,
2008),
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5942.html.
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force shaping nonprofit business these days.32 Therefore, a
nonprofit’s involvement in a Collaboration with a for-profit
requires careful consideration and monitoring by the
nonprofit’s board of directors to ensure: “1) pursuit of the
philanthropic mission and 2) application of the profit towards
the mission.”33
C. Collaboration, Continuum, Care and Cooperation
1. The Collaboration on a Continuum
With the changing business and economic climate, the
dynamics of each type of organization are shifting. In response
to increased funding shortages, nonprofits devise and apply
various methods of raising funding. Some of these efforts
resemble for-profit profit making enterprises. The for-profit
organization may look for ways to be more philanthropic,
moving from purely donating to a deeper involvement with a
nonprofit.34 In general, many perceive for-profits as entering
into Collaborations with nonprofits so they can “bask in the
glow of their esteemed partners.”35 The Collaboration has
become an integral part of the strategy of these organizations
to increase their value.36 The Collaboration between the forprofit and the nonprofit has been described as occurring on a
Continuum, with increasing levels of integration.37 The
Continuum is useful to understanding the varying levels of
involvement the collaborating entities may engage in and the
corresponding duty of care responsibilities.
The Continuum sets forth various descriptive stages in
32. Dennis R. Young et al., Commercialization, Social Ventures, & ForProfit Competition, in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 521, 522 (2012).
33. Vachon, supra note 1, at 22.
34. Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 15, at 96; Martha Minow, Partners,
Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, Nonprofit and
Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (2000).
35. Andreasen, supra note 24, at 50.
36. See Austin & Reficco, supra note 5, at 89.
37. James Austin, Strategic Collaboration Between Nonprofits and
Businesses, 29 HARV. BUS. SCH. NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 69, 71
(2000), available at http://nvs.sagepub.com/content/29/suppl_1/69 [hereinafter
Austin Collaboration].
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which a nonprofit and for-profit may collaborate at increasing
levels of involvement. James Austin in “The Collaboration
Challenge” has identified three stages on the Continuum: the
philanthropic stage, the transactional stage, and the
integrative stage.38 “The characteristics ascribed to each stage
appear in gradations as a multifaceted relationship evolves
incrementally from one stage into another.”39 The deeper the
engagement, the more important the Collaboration becomes to
the collaborating entities, from “peripheral to strategic” as the
resources devoted to the Collaboration by each entity and risk
of loss increase.40 Importantly, the more a collaborating entity
has at stake in the Collaboration, the more the management of
that entity should be involved to effectuate their fiduciary
duties.
2. Duty of Care Intertwined
To accomplish effective implementation and continuation
of the Collaboration, both entities should be aware of the
possible corporate governance issues posed by the
Collaboration. As I discussed in Scratch My Back, the deeper
along the Continuum the Collaboration goes, the more these
corporate governance issues can affect each entity’s
sustainability, and the viability and productivity of the
Collaboration.41
In a Collaboration where the for-profit has stronger
financial capabilities, more resources (e.g., employees), and
more business acumen, its involvement with the nonprofit may
have a negative influence on the management of the Nonprofit,
causing attention and efforts to move away from the
philanthropic mission. Negative impacts such as these can
cause the nonprofit to experience mission drift. Mission drift

38. As James E. Austin described in The Collaboration Challenge the
cross sector interaction tends to follow a specific collaboration continuum
wherein each stage of the continuum has specific identifying characteristics.
AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 20, 34. The three stages in the continuum are
philanthropic stage, transactional stage, and integrative stage. Id.
39. Id. at 35.
40. Id. at 34.
41. See id.; Vachon, supra note 1, at 28-30.
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occurs when the original philanthropic mission of the nonprofit
is no longer the focus of management’s efforts.42 Instead, the
philanthropic goal has been partially or wholly replaced by
something much more akin to for-profit interest.43
The Continuum does not require that one stage happen
before another, nor does the Collaboration have to proceed
further along the Continuum. It can stay in one stage or even
regress. The board of director’s involvement increases the
deeper into the Continuum. At the first stage in the
Continuum, the philanthropic stage, the board of directors and
other management of both entities are usually not very
involved, if at all.44 The deeper into the Collaboration along the
Continuum, the harder it may be for the nonprofit
management to thwart mission drift. In Scratch My Back, I
argue that due to the threat of mission drift in the
Collaboration, the nonprofit’s activities in the Collaboration
and the effect of the Collaboration on the nonprofit need to be
carefully monitored and evaluated by the management of both
collaborating entities depending on where the Collaboration is
on the Continuum. In Scratch My Back, I urge that the
management of a collaborating for-profit has an obligation to
ensure the care and sustainability of the nonprofit because
their duty of care to the for-profit requires it. I urged that this
premise depends on two factors: (1) how far the Collaboration is
situated along the Continuum, and (2) a recognition that the
further along the Continuum, if failure happens, increasingly
negative taint will attach to both parties. First, by being
informed, they will understand that the deeper into the
Continuum the more both entities have invested in the success

42. See Cornforth, supra note 23, at 7-8 (Traditionally, the board is
viewed as protecting the nonprofit’s mission.); Tuckman, supra note 27, at
506.
43. See Tuckman, supra note 27, at 506; Young et al., supra note 32, at
542-43 (provides various examples of mission drift—nonprofits compromised
by for-profit considerations). See also Estelle James, Commercialism and the
Mission of Nonprofits, 40 SOC. J. 29, 29 (2003) (“So long as the charitable goal
of the nonprofit remains the driving force, such commercialization has a
positive impact on the finances and long-term stability of the organization
and the sector.”); Tuckman, supra note 27, at 506; Lasprogata & Cotten,
supra note 15, at 86.
44. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 20.
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of the Collaboration. Second, the success of the Collaboration is
contingent upon the sustainability of both collaborating
organizations.45
Mission drift may result in failure of the nonprofit. If the
nonprofit fails, so too does the Collaboration. Consequently, the
nonprofit’s sustainability determines the success of the forprofit’s engagement in the Collaboration. The success of the
Collaboration determines the success of the business decision
by the for-profit to enter into the Collaboration to achieve its
articulated goals, such as goodwill. Knowing that the
sustainability of the nonprofit determines the sustainability of
the Collaboration, and therefore the success of the for-profit’s
decision, the for-profit management, I argue, must determine
the level of care owed by both entities to ensure the success of
the investment in the Collaboration which may include
ensuring the sustainability of the nonprofit.46
As I argued in Scratch My Back, as the Collaboration
continues to develop, and depending on the form of
Collaboration, the management of both entities will need to
become more involved,47 and especially, to evaluate the impact
the Collaboration will have on each of their companies and the
overall impact on the mission of the nonprofit.48 In this way,
the collaborators need to be vigilant to ensure that the
commercialization pressures of the Collaboration, and the time
and activities allocated to the Collaboration at any point along
the Continuum do not erode and/or erase the nonprofit’s
mission and values.49 For example, over the years The
Timberland Company (“Timberland”) and City Year, Inc. (“City

45. Vachon, supra note 1, at 28-29.
46. Austin & Reficco, supra note 5, at 90 (explaining that at the
integrative stage, there is at least one example where the for-profit held a
seat on the nonprofit partner’s board of directors and had become engaged in
the governance of that partner); Vachon, supra note 1, at 11-12.
47. Vachon, supra note 1, at 12 (citing AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 60, 77,
85).
48. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 60, 77, 85. See Vachon, supra note 1, at 29.
49. Tuckman, supra note 27, at 506; Young et al., supra note 32, at 54243. See James, supra note 43, at 29 (“So long as the charitable goal of the
Nonprofit remains the driving force, such commercialization has a positive
impact on the finances and long term stability of the organization and the
sector.”). But see Lasprogata & Cotten, supra note 15, at 86.
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Year”) have evolved their collaboration into a more and more
integrated cooperative enterprise; however, the contact started
with a cold call from City Year to Timberland asking for a
donation of fifty pairs of boots to be part of a uniform for City’s
Year’s youth corps.50 Over time, the two entities became more
integrated in the Collaboration. In 1994, the chief operating
officer of Timberland was named chairman of the board of
directors of City Year; and in 1995, Timberland created a new
line of apparel called City Year Gear.51 Timberland’s Vice
President of Human Resources provides guidance to City Year
on structuring staff pay plans and labor policies.52 In 2000, City
Year started its first non-urban corps out of the same building
where Timberland has its headquarters in New Hampshire.53
The Collaborators will need to be able to recognize the pull
of Collaboration commercialization that benefits the nonprofit’s
mission and Collaboration commercialization that distorts it.54
Distortion would result in mission drift.55 Some claim that one
of the biggest challenges confronting the nonprofit is mission
drift.56 This is particularly relevant with regards to a nonprofit
that engages in a Collaboration with a for-profit particularly as
they move along the Continuum towards the integrative stage.
If the Collaboration has reached the integrative stage and fails,
both parties will likely carry the taint of a failed to
Collaboration to a greater or lesser extent, especially if one
party to the venture failed ethically, or in the case of the
nonprofit, mission drift occurred.57

50. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 21. See also Susan Nickbarg, Anatomy of a
Partnership: City Year & Timberland Branding/Rebranding, P.R. NEWS 7274
(Dec.
12,
2012),
available
at
http://www.prnewsonline.com/Assets/File/PRNTop100sample.pdf.
51. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 27.
52. Id. at 28.
53. Nickbarg, supra note 50, at 72.
54. Vachon, supra note 1, at 24. See James, supra note 43, at 29.
55. Cornforth, supra note 23, at 7-8; Vachon, supra note 1, at 24.
56. Silverthorne, supra note 31.
57. Vachon, supra note 1, at 29-31.
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3. A Cooperative Enterprise
Before a discussion of how Piaget’s theory of moral
development and emphasis on cooperation and mutual respect
shed light on the corporate governance issues of a
Collaboration, it is important to note that the Collaboration is,
in varying degrees along the Continuum, a cooperative
enterprise. It has been argued that the corporation is a
cooperative association based on the cooperative enterprise
model centered “around the achievement of certain goals.”58 In
the current example of a Collaboration, this type of cooperation
evidences itself with members from each organization working
to achieve the goals of the Collaboration, including promoting
the philanthropic mission. A Collaboration is a cooperative
enterprise, but it is even more so when the duty of care is
intertwined such that the for-profit too should ensure that the
nonprofit management is fulfilling its duty of care.
As Mitchell articulated, the common goal that determines
a common enterprise may be a goal that is narrow and specific,
such as a nonprofit and for-profit collaborating to host a road
race, to something more general and sweeping, such as a
nonprofit and for-profit working together to achieve improved
global literacy.59 The concept that should be considered is what
underlying principles hold the Collaboration together. Mitchell
cites to the two models set forth by Lon Fuller in Two
Principles of Human Association.60 The two models are based
on two different principles: the legal principle and the shared
commitment principle.61 An association marked by the legal
principle tends to have greater formality and structure. Fuller
described the association as premised on “rules of duty and
entitlement.”62 An association of the type known as the shared

58. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 481-83 (recognizing that a second model of
cooperative enterprise may also apply, that of emphasis on shared interest in
the process or activity).
59. Id. at 484 (identifying characteristics of a common goal).
60. Lon L. Fuller, Two Principles of Human Association, in VOLUNTARY
ASSOCIATIONS 6 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1969). See
Mitchell, supra note 1, at 484-85.
61. Fuller, supra note 60, at 6.
62. Id. at 8.
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commitment principle characteristically provides a way for
voluntary association based on common value(s) or goal(s).63 A
church or charitable organization is a good example of an
association convened under the shared commitment principle.
Fuller finds that the majority of human associations have
elements of both principles, shared commitment and legal;
however, once the legal principle asserts itself, it tends to
dominate over the shared commitment principle, tainting the
shared commitment characteristic with a set structure of
responsibilities and powers.64
While a for-profit, and even a nonprofit may arguably be
considered more an association based on the legal principle
than a shared commitment principle, a Collaboration between
the two at the start may be founded very strongly on the
shared commitment principle.65 The entities come together to
achieve the goals of the Collaboration, a shared project to
further the philanthropic mission of the nonprofit, while
recognizing that each entity has its own individual interests in
engaging in the cooperative enterprise. This is similar to a
group of individuals working on a cooperative enterprise, such
as building a bridge. Each person has the common goal of
building the bridge, but each individual has their own
interests, such as getting paid, health care, or other benefits.
III. The Psychology of the Collaboration
A successful Collaboration requires cooperation, mutual
respect, and equality in order to ensure sustainability, attain
the good sought, and benefit both organizations. Psychologist
Jean Piaget’s theory of the moral development of the child, by
indirect analogy, helps to shed light on the unique
characteristics of the Collaboration. The dominant theme from
Piaget’s moral development research was that children would
not develop into autonomous and morally responsible adults
63. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 485.
64. Fuller, supra note 60, at 11-14. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 485.
65. Mitchell notes that although pursuit of profit alone by individuals at
a corporation is a goal, it was not necessarily the goal as a basis for the
shared commitment principle that Fuller had in mind. Mitchell, supra note 1,
at 485-86.
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without having had the experience of cooperative play and
other child games with his equals.66 The competing
characteristics identified by Piaget, which determine the
ingredients for the ideal method of moral development
(constraint versus cooperation, unilateral respect versus
mutual respect, and equality versus inequality), also contribute
to understanding the development of the two organizations and
their Management in the Collaboration.
A. Piaget’s Moral Development Theory
As a sub-category of practical reasoning, moral reasoning
essentially asks the questions about what to do in a particular
situation.67 The unique characteristic of moral reasoning, as
opposed to other types of practical reasoning, is that the
motivation behind the reasoning is some moral principle or
ideal.68

66. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 499. However,
It is meaningless, therefore, to wonder whether it is the
cognitive cooperation (or cooperations) which engender the
individual operations or the other way around. It is at the
stage of concrete operations that new interpersonal
relations of a cooperative nature are established, and there
is no reason why these should be limited to cognitive
exchanges.
JEAN PIAGET & BARBEL INHELDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CHILD 118 (1969).
67. See Jerrold R. Coombs, Attainments of the Morally Educated Person,
in DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL REASONING 17 (1980). “Practical reasoning
involves two distinct kinds of reasons: (1) motivational reasons such as
wants, purposes, or rules of conduct and (2) beliefs about what actions will
fulfill the wants, purposes, or rules of conduct.” Id.
68. See Coombs, supra note 67, at 17. For a moral principle to be
defensible it must meet these standards, at a minimum:
1. It must be the case that the person making the moral
judgment can accept the moral decisions that follow from
the principle in all cases to which it logically applies . . . . 2.
It must be the case that if everyone acted on the principle,
the consequences would not be disastrous . . . . 3. It must be
the case that the principle can be publicly advocated
without defeating the point of adopting the principle.
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Jean Piaget was a child psychologist who, in the 1930s,
researched the moral development of children by observing
them playing simple social games, such as marbles, and
published his results in The Moral Development of the Child.69
Piaget found that the normal progression of a child’s moral
development moved through stages and not necessarily
characterized by specific years.70 He identified three stages of
the child’s development of the consciousness of rules, and four
stages of the child’s development of the practical observance of
the rules.71 Piaget explained the three stages of the child’s
development of the consciousness of the rules. The first stage,
which includes the beginning of the egocentric stage, is where
the superior adult or older child sets the rules to a child’s
game.72 These rules are not yet perceived as coercive by the
child because they are adopted as purely motor skills by the
child or, as the child enters the egocentric stage, perceived
unconsciously and as “interesting examples” of what to do
rather than “obligatory realities.”73 During the second stage,
which includes the bulk of the egocentric stage and the
beginning half of the cooperating stage, the child views the
rules as “sacred and untouchable, emanating from adults and
lasting forever.”74 This reverence by the child to the rules of the

Id. at 19.
69. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 14. In part of his work, Piaget drew from his
contemporaries, in particular, Baldwin, Bovet, Durkheim, and Fauconnet.
WILLIAM KAY, MORAL DEVELOPMENT: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF MORAL
GROWTH FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE 39 (1970).
70. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 14, 26-28. See KAGAN, supra note 2, at 117;
MARY ANN SPENCER PULASKI, UNDERSTANDING PIAGET: AN INTRODUCTION TO
CHILDREN’S COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 15 (1971). “[A] ‘stage’ is held to be a way
of looking at the world that is not implanted in the child by social agents but
actively constructed by the child as he interacts with and tries to make sense
of his world.” Thomas Lickona, Beyond Justice: A Curriculum For
Cooperation, in DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL REASONING 139-40 (Donald B.
Cochrane & Michael E. Manley-Casimir eds., 1980).
71. See ALBERT BANDURA & RICHARD H. WALTERS, SOCIAL LEARNING AND
PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT 206-10 (1963), for a discussion of an opposing
approach indicating, among other things, that “the developmental sequence
proposed by Piaget is by no means predetermined or invariant.”
72. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 28.
73. Id. at 28.
74. Id. at 28, 72 (as “imposed by his elders as a sort of Decalogue
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superior has been referred to as unilateral respect, as opposed
to mutual respect found later in the cooperation context.75 If
someone suggests a modification to the rules, the child views
that modification as a transgression.76 In the third and final
stage, which ultimately results in the child’s recognition of his
and other’s moral autonomy, the child views a rule as a law
resulting from mutual consent, democracy.77 The child
perceives that the rule may be altered if one is able to garner
general opinion in favor of the alteration.78
Piaget’s four stages of the child’s development of the
practical observance of rules describe the child’s application of
the rules.79 Research shows that transformation in cognitive
abilities parallels changes in legal and political perspectives.80
In the first stage, the child’s application is purely motor and
individual-the child functions pursuant to his own desires and
motor habits. At this point in the child’s perception, the concept
of a true set of “collective rules” (rules perceived as applicable
to other children too) does not apply since the rules the child

revealed by divine beings (i.e., adults, including God . . . ”)).
75. PIAGET & INHELDER, supra note 66, at 127.
The sentiment described by Bovet constitutes only one of
two possible forms of respect. We shall call it ‘unilateral,’
since it binds an inferior to a superior who is regarded as
such, and shall distinguish it from ‘mutual respect,’ which is
based on reciprocity of esteem. Unilateral respect, if it is
indeed the source of the sense of duty, begets in the young
child a morality of obedience which is characterized
primarily by a heteronomy that declines later to make way,
at least partially, for the autonomy characteristic of mutual
respect.
Id. at 124.
76. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 28.
77. Id. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 478.
78. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 28.
79. Id. at 26-27. Piaget indicates that the four stage continuum can be
variable and “is not linear in character, and its general direction can only be
observed by schematizing the material and ignoring the minor oscillations
which render it infinitely complicated in detail.” Id. at 27.
80. See Peter Scharf, The Moral Education of the Juvenile Offender: A
Social Dilemma, in DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL REASONING 218 (1980).
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practices are purely motor.81 The second stage, known as the
egocentric stage, begins when the child actually receives the
collective rules from the outside world. The child tends to
imitate the application of the rules but does not play with
others or try to win the game. In this sense, the child still plays
alone, imitating others’ application of the rules with a “purely
individual use of the examples received.”82
Piaget referred to the third stage as “incipient
cooperation.”83 Each child that plays the game endeavors to win
the game. From this perspective, each child is concerned with
“mutual control” and “unification of the rules.”84 It is only after
this point that the game becomes social, and cooperation may
begin.85 However, ideas about the rules continue to be rather
ill-defined and inconsistent between children playing the same
game with each other.86 The aim to win begins in the third
stage. “In the third stage, [t]he thing now is not only to fight
the other boys but also and primarily to regulate the game with
a whole set of systematic rules which will ensure the most
complete reciprocity in the methods used.”87
The fourth and final stage Piaget referred to as the

81. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 26
82. Id. at 27.
The studies one of us conducted on the functions of language
in exchanges among children led to similar results. These,
although they gave rise to the other studies mentioned,
have, however, been far more controversial. The fact is that
the speech of subjects between four and six (observed in
situations in which children work, play and speak freely) is
not intended to provide information, ask questions, etc.
(that is, it is not socialized language), but consists rather of
monologues or ‘collective monologues’ in the course of which
everyone talks to himself without listening to the others
(that is, egocentric language).
PIAGET & INHELDER, supra note 66, at 120-21.
83. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 27.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 46.
86. Id. at 27.
87. Id. at 45-46.
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“codification of rules.”88 “Not only is every detail of procedure in
the game fixed, but the actual code of rules to be observed is
known to the whole society.”89 In the fourth stage, the child is
able to clearly and uniformly articulate the rules of the game. A
child in the third stage “plays as he reasons.”90 In the fourth
stage, the child engages in “juridico-moral discussions,”
discussions to learn the legislation of the game and give
complete mastery of the rules of the game, which Piaget
compares to “formal reasoning in general.”91 In the realm of
moral development, the child would ultimately reach a point
where he recognizes his own moral autonomy and that of
others, creating a notion of reciprocal respect for individual
autonomy.92 In the fourth stage, the child perceives the rule as
a pronouncement of free will by mutual respecting individuals.
This reciprocity developed through cooperative play is key to
moral development.93 As a result, the child does not perceive
the rule as coercive any longer and, instead, sees the rule as
evidence of democratically-established moral law.94Based on
the democratic nature, when the child accepts a moral principle
at this stage, the child also views the principle as an acceptable
guide for anyone.95 The child will not achieve this autonomous
and moral thinking if the child is not exposed to cooperative
play with equals.96
For the child to reach this realization and develop
autonomy, the atmosphere around the child must encourage
cooperation and not constrain. When rules imposed by
superiors constrain the child, the child will experience limited
88. Id. at 27.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 46.
91. Id. at 47.
92. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 478. See also PIAGET & INHELDER, supra
note 66, at 127 (“With advances in social cooperation and the corresponding
operatory progress, the child arrives at new moral relationships based on
mutual respect which lead to a certain autonomy.”).
93. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 70. See also Lickona, supra note 70, at 140
(“Cooperative living and learning give students this opportunity to ‘construct
morality’ for themselves. Through class or community meetings, for example,
they are able to create rules and solutions to problems.”).
94. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 70.
95. See Coombs, supra note 67, at 19.
96. See supra note 66.
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moral development because the rules are unilaterally applied
and, consequently call for little autonomous thinking by the
child. A child will be unable to develop the mutual respect from
interacting with equals and engaging in independent thought
necessary to follow a rule, instead, for morality sake and not
just because it is a rule, moving beyond egocentrism.97 Piaget
stated: “External constraint does not destroy egocentrism. It
covers and conceals when it does not actually strengthen it.”98
To a child in a cooperative play environment, such as in the
sandbox, the rules are no longer sacred tradition set forth by
superiors, the rules are now perceived as developing from
autonomous people in cooperation with each other.99 Through a
steady diet of cooperation, the pressure from cooperation will
cause the child’s egocentrism to wither.100 When the child
accepts the rule at free will, the rule becomes incorporated into
the mind of the child based on the moral background to the
rule, and compliance with the rule becomes spontaneous
because it is developed from and incorporated into the child’s
moral code.101
It is the act of engaging in cooperation that guides the
child to mutual respect, reciprocity and generosity.102 The key
to this stage is cooperation among equals: “For it is of the
essence of cooperation as opposed to social constraint that, side
by side with the body of provisional opinion which exists in
fact, it also allows for an ideal of what is right functionally

97. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 71. Put simply:
[C]onstraint prevented the child from coming to grips with
his own moral agency and relieved him from having to
acknowledge moral responsibility. Cooperation, on the other
hand, produced a recognition of moral autonomy in which
the child was able to develop a form of Kantian reciprocal
respect for his fellows and to acknowledge and accept his
own moral responsibility.
Mitchell, supra note 1, at 478.
98. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 71.
99. Id.
100. Lickona, supra note 70, at 140.
101. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 71-72.
102. Id. at 72.
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implied in the very mechanism of discussion and reciprocity.”103
B. Piaget’s Theory Applied to the Corporation and the
Collaboration
Society in general seems to be ideally modeled from
Piaget’s equilibrium concepts of autonomy, cooperation and
reciprocity.104 He appears to have seen application for his
theory to the broader society at large.105 Characteristics of this
model include “relatively equal and free autonomous beings
seeking their own ends and respecting the ends of others with
agreement on the general principle that each should have the
opportunity to do just that and that governmental restraint is
justified only to sustain that possibility.”106 In 1969, Richard
Merelman was among the first to apply Piaget’s theory to
understand the process of legal socialization. He argued that
without the ability to apply moral reasoning, complex political
and legal thinking is impossible.107
The characteristics of Piaget’s model have been applied to
corporations to offer guidance to “achieve sensible solutions.”108
In today’s society, the corporation is taking on more and more
characteristics of the natural person under law and is also
comprised of natural persons that exercise the corporation’s
decision-making functions and general oversight. Piaget’s
theory about childhood development has been applied to
corporations and management, finding, in general, that a
corporation will function better and more ethically if less
dominated and constrained by rules and laws.109 The same

103. Id. at 72-73. See also Mitchell, supra note 1, at 494-95.
104. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 500.
105. Id. at 493; PIAGET, supra note 1, at 107 (referring to M. Bovet and
stating “it is necessary, in order to grasp the situation, to take account of two
groups of social and moral facts – constraint and unilateral respect on the one
hand, cooperation and mutual respect on the other”).
106. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 500. See also PIAGET, supra note 1, at 25157.
107. See Scharf, supra note 80, at 216.
108. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 493.
109. Id. at 480. “[T]he relationship between managers and other
corporate constituent groups is characterized by exactly the kind of
dominance that Piaget found not only stifles the moral development of the
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concept applies to management, and to a lesser extent the
owners of the corporation, who exercise the powers, rights, and
duties of the corporation.110
While democratic principles have a base in corporate law,
overall the rules of corporate law constrain the corporation. For
a for-profit corporation, corporate law has narrowly drawn the
legal purpose of the corporation and the individuals in the
corporation. This constrains the actions of the corporation itself
and those individuals (the management) who govern the
entity.111 The current legal model of the corporation and laws of
corporate governance, for either for-profit or nonprofit,
recognize roles for individuals (management and shareholders)
instead of recognizing the individual persons. This constraint
by law-bound-roles tends to remove the “person” from the
“corporate personhood.”112 Further, the underlying constraint
on the for-profit is that law restricts its goal as a cooperative
enterprise to, as discussed above, profit maximization for the
benefit of the corporation and its owners.113 This emphasis on
profit maximization tends to limit the management’s ability to
choose the purposes for the corporation and, therefore, tends to
restrain the Management, and therefore the corporation, to
fully exercise of their moral autonomy in corporate
governance.114 Of course considering corporate governance, the
role of stockholders should not be overlooked. Rules of
corporate law also constrain the powers of shareholders,
assigning to them a very limited role in governance and,
therefore, in the shareholders’ ability to influence the moral
actions of the corporation.115
weaker parties, but also leads the strong party to be inattentive to rationality
and justice.” Id. at 498.
110. Id. at 501.
111. Id. at 497.
112. Id. at 488. While this will lead to the obvious conclusion that
Piaget’s model of moral development may not be directly applicable, there is
also a less obvious conclusion that maybe efforts to dehumanize less, allowing
more clear application of Piaget’s model and the increased opportunity for
moral expression and autonomy.
113. Id. at 489-90.
114. Id. See also PULASKI, supra note 70, at 85 (discussing the difference
between constraint based on expiatory versus equality and mutual
cooperation).
115. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 490.
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It is well recognized that the moral responsibility of forprofits and its management has been under considerable
scrutiny. Based on Piaget’s theory, the limitation on the
development of the moral autonomy of the corporation
precludes management and, therefore, the corporation, from
perceiving full moral responsibility for their acts.116 It has been
argued that the required goal of profit maximization leads to
immoral behavior by management, which is be detrimental to
society and the long-term success of the corporation.117
Therefore, applying Piaget’s theory that constraint negatively
affects moral development of the for-profit, the lack of moral
responsibility of the corporation and management should be
attributed to the constraints we have placed upon it.118 By
defining the goal of the for-profit so narrowly, laws and rules
have constrained the corporation from behaving as an
autonomous moral entity.119
Legal constraints have arguably caused the corporation to
be forever consigned to the egocentric and pre-cooperative
stage.120 A child loses his or her physical egocentrism long
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 480.
Id. at 501.
Id.
Id. at 480.
Our concern with managerial loyalty is so central, and our
distrust of management's motives so great, that we have
straitjacketed managers' behavior in a way that essentially
relieves them of moral responsibility for their actions and
thus effectively denies their moral agency. As a
consequence, they often do not behave as morally
responsible actors, except in defiance of the law that
imposes the stockholder-centric profit motive, and thus at
their peril.

Id. at 502.
120. PIAGET & INHELDER, supra note 66, at 118 (“It is highly probable,
then, that the social exchanges characteristic of the preoperatory level are
precooperative; that is, at once social from the point of view of the subject and
centered upon the child and his own activity from the point of view of the
observer. This is precisely what one of us meant by ‘infantile egocentrism.’”).
However,
the axiom that freedom to act in the service of one’s self-
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before the child loses his or her mental egocentrism.121 With
egocentrism, cooperation, the essential element for moral
development, does not exist.122 The child, or the corporation in
this case, receives the rules as “ready-made and external to
subjective feelings,” and thus ends up reflecting the values of
the superior by imitation and not by actually developing and
applying its own moral thinking.123
At birth, says Piaget, the infant is ‘locked in
egocentrism.’ By this he means not that the baby
is self-centered but that he is unaware of
anything beyond himself. He knows nothing of
the
world
apart
from
his
immediate
consciousness and therefore cannot at first
distinguish himself from it or make any sense
out of the variety of stimuli he receives from it.124
We have so restricted the corporation as to essentially assign it
the role of perpetually acting in its self-interest and to not
consider the interests of others.125 Similar to the child, the
constraints on the corporation and management lead the actors
to follow the rules because they are rules, not out of sense of
responsibility for the impact of the corporation’s conduct on
others.126
Mitchell suggested that the answer is to liberalize the
constraints on the corporation so as to provide more flexibility
interest is an absolute, primary good follows from neither
logic nor observation. It is not transparently true that such
freedom is friendlier to human nature or more conducive to
social harmony than the ambivalent acceptance of either of
an obligation to care for a sick relative or of an invitation to
participate in the cooperative creation of an object of beauty.
KAGAN, supra note 2, at 115-16.
121. PULASKI, supra note 70, at 39.
122. PIAGET & INHELDER, supra note 66, at 119 (“True cooperation does
not exist yet, even on the level of play.”).
123. PULASKI, supra note 70, at 81.
124. Id. at 17.
125. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 502.
126. Id. at 479-80.
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for the corporate purpose.127 If the rules were liberalized to
allow the corporation and its interests to be defined to include
those significantly affected by its actions, the corporation may
develop an appreciation for its effects on the world around it. 128
Some states have enacted legislation, other constituency
statutes, or case law which allows corporations to a greater or
lesser extent to consider interests other than profit
maximization for the owners and includes engaging in some
level of Collaboration with a nonprofit.129
Taking it one step further, Piaget’s moral development
theory is similarly applicable to the cooperative enterprise of a
Collaboration between a nonprofit and a for-profit. Research
has shown that in collaborative business ventures the pattern
of interaction affects each party’s ability to meet its goals in the
collaborative venture.130 There are multiple considerations of
the Collaboration in light of Piaget’s model of moral
development. First, the moral development theory offers
insight into the for-profit’s perspective. Arguably, a for-profit
corporation seeking to enter into a Collaboration to pursue a
philanthropic cause may be already working beyond the
constraint on moral development argued by Mitchell.131 By
127. Id.
128. Id. at 503.
129. Id. at 490-91.
The first issue traditionally has been dealt with under the
rubric of corporate social responsibility and has engendered
debates that seem to flare up regularly. Nonetheless, this
issue quite consistently has been resolved in favor of the
private side of the equation, deeming even the largest and
most widely flung corporate empire to be private, with the
assertion that public concerns ought to be dealt with by
public regulation external to the structure of the corporation
itself.
Id.
130. Africa Arino & Jose de la Torre, Learning from Failure: Towards an
Evolutionary Model of Collaborative Ventures, 9 ORG. SCI. 306, 308 (1998).
131. PIAGET, supra note 1, at 61. “We are now definitely in the presence
of a social reality that has rational and moral organization and is yet peculiar
to childhood. Also we can actually put our finger upon the conjunction of
cooperation and autonomy, which follows upon the conjunction of egocentrism
and constraint.” Id.
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further engaging in the cooperative business enterprise of the
Collaboration, the for-profit may be engaging in less
constrained play in the sandbox, outside of the constraint of the
rule of profit maximization. In this way, the cooperative play in
the Collaboration may, in turn, encourage broader moral
development of the for-profit and its Management.
Second, the moral development theory offers insight for the
nonprofit’s perspective. As a cooperative enterprise, the
Collaboration many times involves the nonprofit seeking funds
from the for-profit, and maybe in need of business expertise. In
turn, the for-profit hopes to gain the goodwill by association
with the nonprofit. Many risks of the Collaboration failing due
to failure of the nonprofit center on the premise that the
nonprofit should be treated not as charity but as a true equal in
the Collaboration.132 It has been argued that the for-profit has
greater potential for treating the nonprofit as an inferior or a
subordinate and thereby creating an environment of constraint.
This commentary is not just directed at for-profit management.
In fact, it is equally important that the nonprofit’s
management views the nonprofit as an equal to the for-profit.
Partners in a collaborative business enterprise tend to monitor
the enterprise for efficiency, adaptability, and equity.133 In a
collaborative business enterprise, equity means fair dealing for
both parties.134 The potential dominance of the for-profit over
the subordinate nonprofit would create an environment of
constraint that would stunt the moral development of the
nonprofit organization. Stunted moral development could, in
turn, lead to activities that cause mission drift, illegal conduct,
and other questionable practices affecting the sustainability of
the nonprofit.
Furthermore, if the for-profit management fulfills its duty
of care by taking steps, as suggested above, to ensure that the
nonprofit management is fulfilling its duty of care, a similar
environment of constraint could be created given the potential
for paternalistic conduct by the for-profit management in
132. Andreasen, supra note 24, at 48. Clearly, the interest in the
wellbeing of the nonprofit should not rise to the level as to implicate a conflict
of interest or breach of the corresponding duty of loyalty. Id.
133. Arino & de la Torre, supra note 130, at 307.
134. Id.
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monitoring the nonprofit’s management. In this way, under
Piaget’s theory, if a for-profit were to conduct itself in the
Collaboration in this potentially dominant and oppressive
manner, commanding unilateral respect, the nonprofit’s
development in the Collaboration may suffer. This could affect
its moral autonomy, thereby implicating mission drift. Mission
drift would lead to varying problems for the nonprofit, the
worst of which includes failure of the entity, fraud, illegal
conduct by the management, and violations of IRS regulations.
Mitchell made a similar argument in the context of the state
constraining the corporation. This approach is directly contrary
to the ideal approach of Piaget’s moral development model and
would negatively affect a corporation’s development of moral
autonomy.135 Power imbalances may also have an impact on
the innovative goals the partners in Collaboration seek to
attain.136
Similarly, as nonprofits engage in more commercialization
through Collaboration and for-profits seek goals other than
profit maximization through Collaboration, the law may seek
to offer some regulation over the Collaborative activities and,
perhaps, commercial activity of the nonprofit. This law making
activity would involve consideration of the fiduciary duties in
the unique relationship of the Collaboration. While there is a
benefit to allow management flexibility and power to ensure
the interest of the corporation are fulfilled, it is also important
that these powers are limited. The fiduciary duties serve this
function.137 In the scope of the Collaboration, the lawmakers
may seek to offer guidance and constraints on the powers of
management of both entity types as they seek to engage in
more collaborative efforts. Efforts should be made to avoid
heavy constraint in favor of methods to enhance cooperation
and urging equilibrium between the two entities.138 As Mitchell

135. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 500-01.
136. See Sara Holmes & Lance Moir, Developing a Conceptual
Framework to Identify Corporate Innovations Through Engagement with
Non-Profit Stakeholders, 7 CORP. GOV. 414, 417 (2007) (indicating that
innovation can decrease if one partner perceives itself as inferior).
137. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 493.
138. Id. at 495. Kagan explains:
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argued in the context of the corporation’s moral development:
“Constraint is the enemy of moral development.”139 However,
mechanisms with a certain degree of control will help to reduce
risk and uncertainty in the Collaboration which, in turn,
increases trust between the parties.140
Finally, Piaget’s theory, emphasizing that all important
aspects of human beings’ moral development takes place in the
early years of life of the child, can be discouraging.141 While
Piaget’s moral development theory should be considered as
insightful and offering guidance to consider the corporate
governance issues of the entities in a Collaboration, other
psychologists offer guidance on the continued moral

[T]he moral primacy of this view of individual freedom has a
ring of validity to almost all citizens in our society because,
despite ideological pluralism on many issues, there is a
consensus that there should be minimal restraint on one’s
willed efforts to improve one’s talents and to attain wealth
and status.
KAGAN, supra note 2, at 115
139. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 497 (1995). Pulaski says:
Adult authority is not sufficient to create in children a true
sense of justice. As Piaget points out, this is a situation
which is not in equilibrium and therefore cannot be stable.
The adult is strong and demanding; the child feels weak and
inferior. Unilateral respect leads only to moral constraint.
The factor essential to moral development is mutual respect
and cooperation – “cooperation between children to begin
with, and the between child and adult as the child
approaches adolescence, and comes, secretly at least, to
consider himself as the adult’s equal.
PULASKI, supra note 70, at 40.
140. See Lauren C. Johnson, Understanding the Role of Cross-Sector
Strategic Alliances in the Age of Corporate Social Responsibility (Apr. 12,
2005) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Fletcher School, Tufts University) (on file
with
Tufts
Digital
Library,
Tufts
University),
available
at
http://hdl.handle.net/10427/35290 (indicating that it is important to align
government policies with cross-sector codes of conduct to improve corporate
social performance through learning).
141. Carl Goldberg, Swords into Plowshares: The Recovery Ethics of
Destructive Adult Development, in HANDBOOK OF ADULT DEVELOPMENT 494
(Jack Demick & Carrie Andreoletti eds., 2003).
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development of an individual and, therefore, would similarly
offer insight into the evolution in the Collaboration. In fact, the
human brain continues to develop through a child’s adolescence
and into his or her early twenties.142 Research has shown that
the brain matures until about the age of twenty-five.143 The
corporation, however, is always changing. While the adults in
the organization may have mature brains, the mix of adults
continues to flow, providing different perspectives on morals, if
allowed.
Studies have shown overwhelmingly that during the
second decade of life, adolescents view adults as the legitimate
regulators of moral issues through rules.144 Programs in schools
have observed that the moral development of the adolescents is
continuing and, therefore, have underscored the importance of
educating adolescents for citizenship and participation in
democracy.145 For instance, schools may integrate service
programs into the adolescent’s experience. This allows them to
experience the service, reflect on it, and engage in discussion.
The idea behind this aspect of education comes from the belief
that it can lead to increased moral commitment overall.146
Some research has shown that a human being forms the actual
understanding of the moral underpinnings of society in
adolescence and starts to make “principled moral judgments” in
late adolescence.147 Some of the theories of adolescent moral
development rest, at least in part, on the understanding that
changes in adolescent moral thought are tied to the

142. See THE TEEN BRAIN: STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH 2, 3 (2011).
143. Claudia Wallis et al., What Makes Teens Tick, TIME, May 10, 2004,
at 56. See also Terrance Sandalow, The Moral Responsibilities of Universities,
in MORAL VALUES AND HIGHER EDUCATION: A NOTION AT RISK 149, 168-69
(Dennis L. Thompson ed., 1991) (discussing the importance of universities in
the moral development of the students).
144. Judith G. Smetana & Elliot Turiel, Moral Development during
Adolescence, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENCE 247, 257 (Gerald R.
Adams & Michael D. Berzonsky eds., 2003) (indicating that adolescence
recognition of adult authority is contextually bound: parents are the
authorities outside of school, teachers and administrators are the authorities
in school).
145. Id. at 260.
146. Id. at 262.
147. Id. at 248 (citing to research conducted by Lawrence Kohlberg).
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development of other competencies during that period of
maturation.148 Building from Piaget’s foundation on the
development of moral reasoning, Lawrence Kohlberg added
that with continued moral maturation, the person
progressively reconsiders what is morally right.149 Lawrence
Kohlberg researched the moral development of the human
being from childhood to adulthood.150
For example, Lawrence Kohlberg, in The Philosophy of
Moral Development, offers insight into the development of an
individual from childhood to adulthood.151 In his moral
judgment development theory,152 Kohlberg identified six
frameworks (also referred to as stages) in which human beings
address moral issues.153 Kohlberg discovered that moral

148. Id. at 249 (indicating that “development of formal operational
thought and the development of more advanced perspective-taking abilities”
are two of these other developing competencies).
149. See Scharf, supra note 80, at 214-15.
150. Smetana & Turiel, supra note 144, at 248.
Eisenberg and her colleagues have examined an aspect of
moral reasoning – prosocial judgments – that they believed
was omitted in the previous research focusing on reasoning
about rules and prohibitions. Gilligan and her colleagues
also have focused on aspects of morality they believed were
ignored in previous work – caring (as opposed to justice) in
interpersonal relationships.
Id.
151. See 1 LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 16-22 (1981) [hereinafter ESSAYS ON
MORAL DEVELOPMENT]. See also Mitchell, supra note 1, at 499. Granted,
Kohlberg also recognized that autonomous moral reasoning does not
necessarily lead to good behavior but determined that it most frequently did.
WILLIAM K. KILPATRICK, WHY JOHNNY CAN’T TELL RIGHT FROM WRONG 102
(1992). Kohlberg’s case for moral development beyond childhood has been
referred to as the leading work. David Moshman, Developmental Change in
Adulthood, in HANDBOOK OF ADULT DEVELOPMENT, supra note 141, at 51
(2003).
152. See TIANLONG YU, IN THE NAME OF MORALITY 50-51 (2004)
(discussing developmentalists, particularly Kohlberg’s, emphasis on moral
judgment).
153. Kohlberg identifies these frameworks in his 1984 work THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT. See Moshman, supra note 151, at 5152 (brief discussion of these frameworks and their application). Kohlberg’s six
stages are as follows:
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reasoning increases in intellectual complexity and moral
principle the further along the stages an individual moves.154
The sixth stage is the most morally principled, while the first
stage is the least. He identified another level of development
beyond Piaget’s theory of moral development of the child,
labeled “post-conventional.”155 At this level, the human being
engages in the principled moral judgments.156 Kohlberg’s
research and theory have been used as evidence that human
beings can progress in moral development into adolescence and
adulthood.157 “Significantly, Kohlberg’s data suggest that Stage
5 moral reasoning is used by less than 20 percent of adult
Americans and by few adolescents, although it can be
understood intuitively by a larger proportion of people.”158
Kohlberg recognized the role of moral education in the
development of moral individuals and institutions.159 He
viewed moral development as the product of “increasing ability

[a]t Stage 1, law is conceived as the force of the powerful, to
which the weaker must submit. At Stage 2, right action
becomes that which satisfies one’s own needs: law is
thought of in terms of the rules of expedience or a naive [sic]
rational hedonism…. Stage 3 offers what is called the good
boy/girl orientation: law becomes associated with collection
opinion; one obeys the law because that is what others
expect. At Stage 4, there is a shift toward fixed definitions of
law and society: the law is justified by its order-maintaining
function… Stage 5 is a legalistic-contract orientation: law
becomes the agreed-upon contract among social equals with
duties of state and individual clearly defined and regulated.
At Stage 6, Kohlberg argues that there is a universal basis
for ethical decision-making: the law is the repository for
broader social principles and is subordinate where law and
justice conflict.
Scharf, supra note 80, at 215.
154. See Ralph L. Mosher, Funny Things Happen on the Way to School
Democracy, in DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL REASONING, supra note 67, at 84
(1980).
155. ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 151, at 18.
156. Smetana & Turiel, supra note 144, at 249.
157. See Moshman, supra note 151, at 51.
158. See Mosher, supra note 154, at 84.
159. See id. at 85.
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to perceive social reality or to organize and integrate social
experience.”160 His theory underscores the importance of the
social environment to stimulate progress in moral reasoning.161
He held that the problem responsible for the latent capacity for
full moral reasoning is that human thought must be provoked
by experiences, particularly through interactions in a
democratic and equitable community.162 The child’s and
adolescent’s educational experience is a large part of his or her
social experience. “As it comes into contact with education,
ethics as a discourse about principles is transformed into an
applied morality.”163 Unfortunately, as Kohlberg pointed out,
many teachers are not aware of the role they have in moral
education and do not have training or clear views on the
concept.164 Kohlberg also recognizes the value of a system of
“checks and balances” to support rights and protect against
behavior by individuals who have not fully moved through the
six stages of moral development.165 Kohlberg explains that the
role of the educating environment “depend[s] upon the valueperspective of functional sociology, the perspective that the
invisible hand of societal survival guides the shaping of human
institutions and gives them a value or wisdom not apparent at
first glance.”166
This urges that, like a natural person, the corporate person
is in continual moral development and underscores the
importance of the influence by the partner with which the
collaborating entity chooses to engage in the Collaboration.

160. ROBERT COLES, THE MORAL LIFE OF CHILDREN 26-27 (1986) (internal
quotations omitted).
161. See Scharf, supra notes 80, at 215.
162. See Mosher, supra note 154, at 84-85.
163. SHARON TODD, LEARNING FROM THE OTHER 5 (2003) (indicating that
“education frequently becomes a practice through which ethical principles
and ideals are made into concrete moral obligations, duties, and the like, and
responsibility itself is based on the degree to which such obligations are
fulfilled”).
164. See Lawrence Kohlberg, Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for
Moral Education, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT, MORAL EDUCATION, AND KOHLBERG
18 (Brenda Munsey ed., 1980) [hereinafter MORAL EDUCATION].
165. See Lawrence Kohlberg, Educating for a Society, MORAL
EDUCATION, supra note 164, at 457-61 (analyzing Nixon’s conduct in
Watergate and recognizing the value of a system of “checks and balances”).
166. MORAL EDUCATION, supra note 164, at 15, 19.
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Research has shown that, through learning in Collaborations,
for-profits’ social performance can be enhanced.167 The forprofit and nonprofit in the Collaboration can be seen as
educators to each other and should, therefore, respect their
corresponding roles. “If we think of moral education as
something carried on at the adult level, we recognize that the
effective moral educator is something of a revolutionary rather
as an instiller of virtues.”168 From this perspective, the
collaborator in the Collaboration, the public and law makers
may be viewed as part of the revolutionary model, continuing
the guidance of the corporation in its moral development by
offering democratic guidance with adequate flexibility.169
IV. Conclusion
Increased need has led to increased numbers of nonprofits,
straining their already limited resources. Increased need, on
the other hand, combined with the changing perspective on
corporate value has created new opportunities for for-profit
organizations to add value through cross-sector Collaboration
with nonprofits. The Collaboration offers both the nonprofit
and for-profit an opportunity to work together towards an
identified philanthropic good. At play in the Collaboration
sandbox, there are various stages on the Continuum at which
the collaborators may engage. As the level of engagement
becomes higher, so too does the need for the management to be
involved so as to properly exercise their duty of care, decisionmaking, and oversight. Since the cross-sector Collaboration
offers a new opportunity for both types of entities to advocate
for the good and to develop as entrepreneurs, the law in this
area continues to experience parallel changes and

167. See Bindu Arya & Jane E. Salk, Cross-Sector Alliance Learning and
Effectiveness of Voluntary Codes of Corporate Social Responsibility, 16 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 211, 228 (2006) (indicating that it is important to align government
policies with cross-sector codes of conduct to improve corporate social
performance through learning).
168. MORAL EDUCATION, supra 164, at 65. But see ALBERT BANDURA,
SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY (1977) (providing a differing view to Kohlberg’s
model of development).
169. See, e.g., supra note 168.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/5

34

2013]

PLAYING IN THE SANDBOX

1079

enhancements. Given the unique characteristics of a for-profit
and nonprofit collaborating together and the evolving nature of
the sandbox of Collaborations, the management of both entities
must pay particular attention to their effective rendering of the
duty of care. Depending on the level of integration of the
Collaboration along the Continuum, the for-profit, given its
knowledge of profit generating business and access to more
resources, may consider whether the nonprofit’s management
is fulfilling their oversight and decision making function in an
informed and responsible manner. This is particularly true if
the Collaboration is successful in promoting its goals of
fundraising for the philanthropic mission. If proper care is not
directed towards the nonprofit, the sustainability of the
nonprofit itself may be called into question due to mission drift,
possible improper conduct by management, and problems with
the IRS. The risks for negative consequences to the nonprofit
increase the further along the Continuum if steps are not taken
to counter the effects of the Collaboration on the culture and
mission of the nonprofit.170
With Piaget’s moral development theory as a guide, his
Article establishes that a for-profit should view the
sustainability of the collaborating nonprofit as a responsibility
under its own duty of care further along the Continuum. This
responsibility focuses on the unique influences of the
Collaboration on the nonprofit and ensures that the nonprofit
does not abuse the tax-exempt status, commit fraud or other
illegal conduct, and maintains adequate measures in place to
continue pursuit of the mission. Jean Piaget’s theory provides
considerable insight into how to manage the relationship
between the for-profit and nonprofit in the Collaboration. The
deeper into the Continuum and the more cross-efforts by
management of the entities, the greater the need for guidance
from the for-profit to the nonprofit as improved results are
achieved and, on the other hand, the greater the potential for
paternalistic conduct by the for-profit and regulation by law
makers to the point of constraint on the moral development of
both entities in the Collaboration. This would be contrary to
the intended results of the Collaboration and to the greater

170. Austin & Reficco, supra note 5, at 90.
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good of society.
Both a nonprofit and for-profit corporation entering into a
Collaboration seek promotion of a philanthropic good and some
degree of development of their organization. In particular, the
for-profit seeks improvement of good will from associating with
the nonprofit, and the nonprofit seeks access to more funds and
capabilities. The Piaget moral development theory prescribes
an approach to the Collaboration which emphasizes one of
cooperation, equity, and mutual respect. While a child usually
outgrows the constraint by the rules and establishes his or her
own autonomy, a corporation is always bound by constraint,
including the rules applicable to corporate governance.171 This
would advocate in favor of a middle ground for regulation,
where there is guidance but not overly constrictive rules.
Piaget’s theory of moral development applies to the
behavior of children and, as such, does not necessarily directly
parallel the moral development of corporate entities in the
Collaboration.172 However, the core tenants of Piaget’s moral
development theory—cooperation and mutual respect or
constraint and unilateralism—shed light on and offer guidance
related to implementation of corporate governance standards
and the corresponding duty of care. We see the concepts play
out in the Collaboration’s interactions. Further, corporate
governance itself generally relates to a tug-of-war between
constraint and freedom: constraint from management’s
opportunism and freedom for management to make business
decisions.

171. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 480.
172. See Id. at 499.
It would be silly to argue that direct parallels exist between
corporate behavior and children's behavior, and I do not
attempt to do so. Instead, I have tried to draw one of the
central insights from Piaget's work to show how it
illuminates important problems in corporate law. This
central insight concerns the effects of constraint and
cooperation on moral development and growth.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/5

36

